A mailed letter would work. Plenty of other orgs do that as the only way to communicate your PIN to you.

It's interesting that this isn't one of the three traditional ways to authenticate, but it's obviously effective to some degree. Maybe it suggests a new mode of authenticating: some place where you are.

Yes, it's nice and concise at about 150 pages,

https://www.amazon.com/Calculus-Manifolds-Approach-Classical...

Marijuana use is correlated with improved outcomes for patients in opiate addiction programs. That said, I'm not sure what you mean by marijuana being more pleasant than opioids. Have you done both?

I had a bike crash about six months ago and was prescribed a handful of Norco, which is about the least opioid opiate around these days. If the phrase "worst constipation of your life" does not yet have meaning...

I was prescribed oxycodone after getting hit by a car and my liver couldn't process the Tylenol in the pIll adequately and I was feeling nauseous and faint. I collapsed in my primary care doctor's office when getting looked over a couple days after leaving ER.

I decided to just bear through the searing pain than risk permanent organ damage.

This reminds me of game development when we had racks filled with PCs with every graphics board on the market.

I know a prominent psychiatrist who believes that antidepressants are largely useless. He still prescribes them all the time because his patients expect him too.

And how strongly do you believe your speculation? I think you are completely wrong, so I'm curious. What do you place the odds at that sites similar to Atlantis and SR(namely sheep and bmr) will go down by the end of the year?

>I would start by examining where all the major Tor exit nodes are, since that's likely where you would hide your heavy trafficked Tor hidden service, right beside a giant exit node to blend in with the other traffic. Feds already know this, this is probably how they caught Freedom Hosting.

You would not want to run a heavily used hidden service that you want to remain hidden right beside an exit node. That would be foolish.

I wouldn't want to run a long-lived service which attracted serious attention on an onion routed network. You could get some initial protection by terminating the onion frontend traffic on "tamper resistant, untraceable, throwaway nodes", and then backhaul (maybe via Tor?), to other servers, etc. The frontends would be able to do some local processing to maybe break up the traffic somewhat.

All of this kind of stuff would impair site reliability. IMO, if SR went down more often, I'd have a higher opinion of the paranoid exhibited by the admins. A highly reliable underground site is usually either 1) run by people who are going to get caught or 2) run by people who are doing the catching. There's I guess 3) run by really exceptional people who are doing it as a political statement -- generally unlikely, but in this case, possible.

I can't tell if you are disagreeing with djao or not.

"I can't think of a single respectable academic researcher who thinks that the latest results threaten RSA." -- djao

Does Dan Boneh think that the latest results threaten RSA? Is there a serious argument in favor of that position?

You seem to be asking two questions that my comment already answered. Yes, I'm citing Boneh as an example of someone who has suggested that Joux may have practical implications on RSA.

You are perhaps referring to Boneh's comments at the RSA conference last February. Boneh cited the new attacks in the context of arguing that we should diversify away from RSA and DH. The implication, to me, was one of general caution and urgency. I did not get any sense of RSA itself being specifically threatened.

I'm having trouble writing a response to this that reconciles your last sentence with the sentence that precedes it. I think that might be because we're on the same page already.

I'm not endorsing the article's interpretation of the talk.

There is a difference between "Here's an example of a cryptosystem that got attacked" and "Here's an example of an attack against RSA."

The intent of the talk was also to urge caution and urgency, was the point I was trying to make.

The thing is, some people think we're already on a 10-year clock. Quantum computers represent a very real threat, and there are no theoretical obstacles to their implementation. So yes, we should be migrating to something else. These latest breakthroughs add more impetus, but I don't think they're going to get there before quantum computers (just my opinion).