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I know exactly how BGP works, I actually implemented a BGP reflector long time ago. My home has two DIA circuits and my home network is announced via BGP.

> In the case of attacking the ALPN ACME validation, they hijack the IP address of the site they want a TLS certificate for: example.org resolves to 1.2.3.4, I hijack traffic to 1.2.3.4, the DNS flow is unchanged, the verification traffic comes to me, and I get a certificate for example.org

As I said, a CAA record in DNS will prohibit this, instructing the ACME CA to use the DNS challenge.

> I hijack traffic to the real IP that it resolves to and serve up responses for the site I want to hijack saying “yea, these are the records you want and don’t worry, the DS bit is set to true”.

And then your faked DNS replies will have a wrong signature because you don't have the private key for the DNS zone.

And DNSSEC-validating clients will detect this because the top-level domain will have a DNSKEY entry for the hijacked domain. You can't fake the replies from the top-level domain DNS because it in turn will have a DNSKEY entry in the root zone.



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