I skimmed the paper; it has a lot of issues. First it doesn't attempt to frame the theory in our current best understanding of the problem of consciousness. It doesn't say up front if its attempting to explain qualia or just give a new understanding of the functional aspects of consciousness.
The next issue is that it doesn't do much explaining. If it is attempting to explain qualia, it needs to explain how the functional descriptions on offer help in explaining why there is a qualitative feel associated with conscious states. If it's not attempting to explain qualia, then it needs to clearly identify the functional problem it is proposing to solve, then explain how the theory solves it. Many homegrown theories mistake description for explanation. Just giving existing functions a new name in the guise of a new framework doesn't explain anything. A reframing can be useful, but it should be made explicit that the theory is a reframing rather than an explanation, and what benefits this framing gives to solving various problems related to consciousness.
Another issue is that it spends too much time talking about implications and not enough time just communicating the core ideas. Each major section has like a paragraph or two. This isn't enough for a proper introduction to the section, let alone a sufficient description of the theory.
Back to qualia: in my opinion, and your mileage obviously varies, it’s not even a wild goose chase — it’s more like The Hunting of the Snark.
Consciousness isn’t just a spotlight, it’s the forced arbitration of billions of cellular demands. Each of our ~40 trillion cells has a survival stake and pushes its signals upward until the mind must take notice. That’s why certain experiences intrude on us whether we like it or not: grief that overwhelms reason, sexual arousal that derails attention, the impossibility of not laughing at an inappropriate moment, or the heat of embarrassment that turns thought itself into a hostage.
In that sense, qualia aren’t mystical paint on top of neural function — they’re the felt residue of our cells voting, insisting their needs be weighed in the conscious workspace. The Predictive Timeline Simulation framework is my attempt to make that arbitration explicit — testable in neuroscience, relevant to psychiatry, and useful for AI models.
Perhaps read the paper instead of skimming or running it through an AI. I believe that your complete understanding would either sharpen your criticisms or perhaps improve the paper.
> "A reframing can be useful, but it should be made explicit that the theory is a reframing rather than an explanation, and what benefits this framing gives"
Fair critique — and I’ll own that the paper emphasizes reframing more than exhaustive exposition. To be precise:
• I am not claiming to solve the Hard Problem of qualia. I position qualia as an evolved data format, a functional necessity for navigating a deterministic universe — not as metaphysical mystery.
• What the paper does aim to explain is the predictive, timeline-simulating function of consciousness, and how errors in this function (e.g. Simulation Misfiling) may map to psychiatric conditions.
• The “implications” section is deliberately forward-looking, but I agree the exposition could be expanded. That’s the next step — this is a framework, not the final word.
If nothing else, I hope the paper makes explicit that reframing consciousness as a predictive timeline simulator is testable, bridges physics + neuroscience, and invites experiments rather than mysticism.
The next issue is that it doesn't do much explaining. If it is attempting to explain qualia, it needs to explain how the functional descriptions on offer help in explaining why there is a qualitative feel associated with conscious states. If it's not attempting to explain qualia, then it needs to clearly identify the functional problem it is proposing to solve, then explain how the theory solves it. Many homegrown theories mistake description for explanation. Just giving existing functions a new name in the guise of a new framework doesn't explain anything. A reframing can be useful, but it should be made explicit that the theory is a reframing rather than an explanation, and what benefits this framing gives to solving various problems related to consciousness.
Another issue is that it spends too much time talking about implications and not enough time just communicating the core ideas. Each major section has like a paragraph or two. This isn't enough for a proper introduction to the section, let alone a sufficient description of the theory.